1. Introduction
Somalia is a nation with the longest coastline in Africa, lying adjacent to some of the busiest maritime routes in the world. However, maritime security in this area has been persistently threatened by piracy. From a geostrategic perspective, this location should place the country in a central and decisive role in shaping and controlling regional maritime security. In reality, the task of ensuring maritime safety has largely depended on external forces rather than actors within the region itself. This raises the question: Is the security of African seas truly in African hands? Or is it still dominated by external actors?
2. The piracy situation in Somalia
Piracy (the unlawful act of attacking ships or commercial vessels at sea committed for personal purposes, including ransom, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) in Somalia is not a rare phenomenon. Since the early 1990s, amid state fragility and a lack of governance, local fishing communities have begun attacking illegal foreign trawlers to protect their livelihoods and marine resources [1]. However, over time, they developed into full-fledged, organized gangs with elaborate ransom campaigns, rather than just serving defensive purposes [2]. During the period from 2010 to 2020, piracy incidents declined significantly due to coordinated international counter-piracy efforts.
However, these favorable results did not last for long. In December 2023, Somali pirates hijacked the vessel MV Ruen from Bulgaria amid rising insecurity in the Red Sea, following the Houthis ’ attacks [3]. This highlights the fact that piracy has not yet been fundamentally solved. It should not be understood only as a naval challenge, but rather as a direct consequence of the fragmentation of government systems and the limited governance capacity.
3. International responses and their effectiveness
To combat piracy and safeguard vital international shipping lanes, beginning in 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a series of resolutions that fundamentally reshaped the governance of Somali waters, authorizing states to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy [4]. Multinational naval forces were subsequently established, including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the European Union Naval Force under Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR), NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, and the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) in 2009.
This approach yielded considerable results: pirate attacks declined sharply, and the economic costs of piracy significantly reduced. Between 2017 and 2022, piracy was nearly eradicated. The economic losses caused by Somali piracy decreased from approximately 6.6-6.9 billion USD dollars in 2011 to around 5.7-6.1 billion USD dollars in 2012, following the 2011 international cooperative campaign [5] [6].
Subsequently, a model of “stable dependence” was established: maritime security was ensured by the presence of foreign naval escorts, not by Somalia’s capacity. This, in turn, undermined the already delicate success when the root causes persisted, and Somalia was unable to self-govern its seas. Piracy can only be contained, not eradicated.
Meanwhile, poverty, drought, and political instability persist, affecting the lives of the local population and nurturing the conditions for the re-emergence of piracy [7] [8]. This will create a vicious cycle where security is upheld externally, but internally, dependence grows, and no meaningful progress is made.
4. Solutions
Solutions, hoping to break through, must be fulfilled: (i) control the pirates’ activities on the sea, (ii) strengthen the capacity of the region to fight against piracy. When approaching regional solutions, there are two ways to examine efficiency: top-down and bottom-up.
The former approach suggests a coalition of regional efforts, either internationally led or regionally set up. The Djibouti Code of Conduct is an example of such internationally led joint efforts, envisioned to create a framework for the region to enhance capacity and cooperation through the PIU (Project Implementation Unit), which is undertaken and funded by the international community. The framework signals a transition to stronger regional ownership of initiatives, which offers a legal foundation for regional states to take action in accordance with agreements, including the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of piracy suspects, cooperation, and coordination [9].
The latter approach indicates the proactive role of regional states and Somalia itself in taking responsibility. Somalia shall be the main actor in holding itself responsible by strengthening capacity building, improving socio-economic conditions, and launching its own piracy combating strategy. Communities in Somalia are taking the initiative in leading anti-piracy campaigns, demonstrating the importance of local solutions [9]. The Somali authorities should develop a central strategy and further ignite local communities’ capacity to combat piracy effectively.
Concerning joint efforts at a regional level, ReCAAP’s success in the Western Indian Ocean demonstrated a precedent-setting approach that African nations should study, thus establishing a regional institution aligned with its own characteristics [10]. Much as the international community or regional leaders owning ample resources and expertise to dictate the operation, Somalia holds the central role in dealing with the problem with their people’s resiliency and solidarity. The international community would be better off providing them with the support they need.
(Posted in March 2026)
AUTHORS
Nguyễn Tuấn Phong - Faculty of International Politics and Diplomacy, 51st Cohort, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam;
Phan Bá Thịnh - Faculty of International Politics and Diplomacy, 52nd Cohort, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
Đậu Lê Minh Hạnh- Faculty of International Politics and Diplomacy, 50th Cohort, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
Phạm Ngọc Quốc Khanh - Faculty of International Politics and Diplomacy, 52nd Cohort, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
GRAPHIC DESIGNER
Vũ Phương Giang, Faculty of International Politics and Diplomacy, 52nd Cohort, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
REFERENCES
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